A Kantian Solution to the Problem of Evil
Dean Lubin

The problem of evil is, basically, the problem of understanding how, if there is an all-powerful, all-knowing, perfectly good God, there can be (so much) evil in the world. Wouldn’t a God of this kind prevent such evil from occurring? In the course of this paper, I consider what I take to be certain consequentiality assumptions underlying typical statements of the problem of evil. These assumptions relate, for example, to the consequentiality’s understanding of the nature of perfect goodness and to his understanding of God’s responsibility for human actions he fails to prevent. I call these assumptions into question and, adopting a non-consequentiality, Kantian perspective on morality, I consider what, for a Kantian, God can be said to be morally “required” to do. In particular, I respond to the problem of evil by arguing that for a Kantian moral goodness (indeed, perfect moral goodness) does not involve God performing acts of intervention in cases of moral or natural evil.

Full Text: PDF     DOI: 10.15640/ijpt.v3n1a6