

Reality and Value

Dr. Qamar Sultana¹

Abstract

In this research article I have laid stress on the two fundamental aspects of human life i.e. "values and importance of reality". This is not a new topic in the history of philosophy. Philosophy since the days of antiquity has debated over it. As philosophy keeps an eye and encompasses the whole universe so it's impossible to ignore this aspect. In the present article I have mentioned all the references from Plato to modern philosophers, keeping in mind the type and nature of value objectively and subjectively, i.e. what are values? From where values come? How they influence human life and the prevailing conditions subsequently. I have acquainted my work to the philosophy of Iqbal in general and Quranic verses for this purpose in particular. Consequently, scientific and phenomenal aspect is deemed in complete without values. In this context values are those spiritual powers that determine the path of reality.

Keywords: Reality, value, subjective, objective, valuation, spiritual powers

Nature of Value:

Value is one of the last the great philosophic topics to have received recognition consciousness of value differs in kind from consciousness of fact. It is an attitude assumed towards fact; Values are recognized by many philosophers. Moreover, the genesis of values and their relations to the objects of desire to which they refer, to the value- feelings which accompany them, and the valuation- processes and value- judgments by which they are reached, instigate to a number of psychological inquiries, while their validity raises the deepest questions of epistemology, metaphysics and religion.

The history of the notion:

Historically the importance of the problem of value and reality has been recognized very slowly and gradually when Plato conceived the Good as the culmination of the ideal world and as the principle which was to unify, systematize, and organize all other 'forms' he was really putting 'value' above 'being', conceiving it as the supreme principle of explanation, and expressing the same thought as Lotze, when he declared that the beginning of metaphysics lies in ethics. The modern developments of the subject proceed from Kant, who said that essential beliefs (in God, freedom, and immortality) could not be scientifically justified. He thus established (1) a dualism between faith and knowledge, and (2) a supremacy of the practical over the theoretic reason. For a long time the investigation of value was carried on only in Germany. The rise of pessimism and the influence of Schopenhauer (1788-1860), by raising the question of the value of life as a whole, emphasized the importance of values.

¹ Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Government Postgraduate College for Women Sargodha, Pakistan, Phone: 0322-7538298 , E-mail: Qamar.sultana2012@gmail.com

Experience of facts and experience of worth or values of such facts are equally fundamental as facts of mental life. Philosophy, which seeks to understand experience as a whole, cannot leave out of account an interpretation of our value-experiences. The great philosophers from Plato to Hegel bear out this truth. So far the fact is simple. But when we believe with Hamlet that, "there is nothing either good or bad but thinking makes it so, we are in doubt whether ideas of value are inventions of mind or they are objectively real. To Sartre there are no objective values. The individual creates his values by his free choice, and "...man himself interprets the sign as he chooses".[1] The doctrine of higher ends gives aid, comfort and support to every socially isolated and socially irresponsible scholar, specialist, and religionist. It protects the vanity and irresponsibility of his calling from observation by others and by himself. There are others who argue that 'man does not make values any more than he makes reality.'[2] The presence of the ideal is the reality of God within us',[3] is an argument we find in the beginning of modern philosophy. To religion values are the alpha and omega, the permanent elements of the changing world.' The ultimate identity of value and existence',[4] is the creed of speculative idealism and mysticism.

A judgment of value pre-supposes a distinction between the ideal and the actual. A judgment of value means that a fact is judged by reference to an ideal or norm. This raises the question of the relation between value and reality. It has been maintained in this article that value is objective and real. Reality is constituted of value.

Sorts of Values:

It is admitted that distinct species of value exist thus,

1. Economic value, has been recognized by political economy
2. That ethics deals with values, although there is dispute as to what the specific ethical values are and how they are related.
3. Aesthetic values.
4. Pleasure must be regarded as a positive and pain as a negative value.

The importance of the Problem of Value:

The entire discussion-making process is based on what is important to our values. Everything we do- every decision we make and every action we take is based on our values. Thus, our decisions are bound up with the values that we hold. Values are important in life because they cover the whole range of people's feelings, thoughts and actions. The problem of value has assumed great importance for philosophical thinkers in modern times. The 'traditional values' are called in question, yet the problem is the centre of interest. The attitude that has now developed is one of evaluating the results achieved by man. One may trace the source of this change in the attitude of Nietzsche who advocated 'trans-valuation' of values', in order to create new values and a new civilization.

Trans-valuations: The process of reflective reconsideration of given values continually leads to changes in their status. Hence, 'trans-valuation' must be regarded as normal and entirely legitimate occurrences in every sphere of values, though they are not everywhere as socially prominent as in the annual changes of the fashions. But it is not psychologically possible to repeat a valuation. The second time the valuation has lost its novelty, and the delight of discovery is gone. Nietzsche takes this problem more intensely. He says; " valuation itself is only this will to power".[4] In the words of Urban, 'From Plato to Kant and Hegel it is always as a world of values that it is ultimately thought'.[5] In the philosophy of the past, 'the good' was considered the ens realissimum-the end. The modern philosophy of value claims novelty by emancipating itself from such notion of value or the good as virtue or as an end to be realized and it coins a new term 'axiology'. The emergence of the theory of value as a distinct problem was due to Kant, as both Hoffding and N.Kemp Smith point out, because of his emphatic distinction between valuation and explanation.

Understanding value and Evaluation:

All objects can be valued by being included in a valuation-process. Value acquires objectivity.

By the comparison of value-judgments it appears that different persons value very differently; hence many value-judgments, being in dispute, are regarded as 'merely subjective'; objects which have obtained social recognition as valuable come to rank of 'objective values'.

Here we can say that, some make appreciation only a consequence of understanding, while the mystics and the theologians make understanding dependent on appreciation. But understanding and appreciation are found intermingled in our experience. As Hoffding points out, 'Philosophy has been inclined to permit their intermingling. So Plato's 'ideas' and Spinoza's 'substance' express by the same term how those two thinkers understood being and how they estimated its worth'.^[6] To the view that appreciation is a consequence of understanding, we may reply that the quest of knowledge for its own sake is a later stage in the development of mind. It is to serve some interest that man seeks to know. The reply to the other view is that consciousness of fact is as fundamental as value-consciousness. When people know what they value, they are more critical in their thinking about what is right for them.

The distinction between appreciation of value as subjective and apprehension of object as objective is untenable. If the appreciation of value is called subjective because it arises out of feelings and desires, then, 'it is equally true that our apprehension of things arises out of sensation, and so this also is subjective. Again, if in a sense a thing thought about may be called an object, then the believer in the objective theory may be said to be a believer in objectivity also. In making the judgment 'the rose is beautiful', the mind passes beyond the affective-conative experience and judges the rose by reference to an ideal or norm. Appreciation of value is not concerned merely with our feelings and desires. Experience, Sorley points out, 'refers to an object which is not to be identified with the process of experience'.

In his book 'Valuation', Urban attempts to reduce the antithesis between appreciation and description to a distinction between two types of description, namely, appreciative and scientific. He rightly points out that 'there can be no description, even the most scientific, without an appreciative element.'^[7] In description, 'there is always an element,' he says, 'which just escapes. But some of the meaning is conserved; otherwise it isn't description.'^[8] If it is so, we ask; how is appreciative description a true description of appreciation? We agree with Urban that appreciation is not an 'incommunicable dream'. It is also true that we objectify our experience on account of 'the need of participating with others in the social concourse'.^[9] We indeed search for presentations with which our experience is related. Yet we think that some element of our appreciation is not expressible in terms of description. It is the self which values. The self realizes the value. The realization itself cannot be completely described or objectified. Here Iqbal comments; 'the scientific and the religious processes are in a sense parallel to each other. Both are really descriptions of the same world with this difference only that in the scientific process the ego's standpoint is necessarily exclusive, whereas in the religious process the ego integrates its competing tendencies and develops a single inclusive attitude...'^[10]

The Subjective Conception of Value:

To the subjectivist value means 'a quality of anything that satisfies a need or evokes a feeling of pleasures.'^[11] It is held that every assertion of value depends on the affective-conative life. But if the value of an object consists in its satisfaction of desire, in the fulfillment of interest, then the concept of value is pre-supposed. To say that pleasure confers a value is to assume a criterion of value.

To the egoistic hedonist value consists in the pleasure of the individual. The egoistic voluntarist seeks value in the individual's desire. To the pragmatist utility is the underlying idea or criterion of value. Ehrenfels thinks desire, inclination, and striving to be the source of values. He defines 'worth of an object as its desirability and makes actual desire the fundamental.'^[12] It may be pointed out that actual desire does not necessarily determine judgment of value. Desirability or value cannot be identified with actual desire. Laird remarks that Ehrenfels argues in the manner J.S. Mill did. To Meinong worth-experience consists in the feeling of pleasure. He identifies actual value-experience with feeling. But, do we value the feeling? Objective values appear in consciousness through feeling in which case feeling is the clothing or the grab. Valuation may involve feeling, but we think it is not the feeling that is valued.

Valuation is an interpretation in terms of the ideal or the norm which is other than the feeling itself. To Perry value implies relationship to interest. To him the basis of value is 'biological interest'. Value is objective. Still Perry's view is a form of subjectivism. It may be said that, on these views, systematic evaluation is not possible, if value-experience is reduced to the momentary feeling. Systematic evaluation is possible when these experiences are judged by some ideal or norm.

We are also told that values are not created by the individual. Values depend on the condition of society. For an individual values have an over-individual meaning. He receives these values and accepts them. Values are relative to human conditions and knowledge. This view is called social subjectivism. Values are not inherent in things and are not really objective. It may be noted that the environmental and social changes do not disprove the objectivity of values. Value itself does not change but our ideas about it change. Morality, for instance, is a development, the stages of which can be traced historically. It is related to society. But that does not justify reduction of morality to sociality. Sorley rightly distinguished between 'the process by means of which we become aware of value and the value itself of which we become aware'. [13]

The Objective Conception of Value:

The realistic conception of value rests on the belief that the objective world and mind are not related. The realists do not think that value is value for consciousness. Laird's theory rests on the principle: "whatever matters to a thing, or concerns it, is a value or disvalue to that thing. Since everything matters to itself, self-maintenance is a value to every existent". [14] On this view, we need not distinguish between fact and value. Though objective, it is independent of mind and consciousness. In his conception of value as intrinsic, Moore distinguishes value as intrinsic from intrinsic properties of objects, but both of them depend on the intrinsic nature of objects. Moore also says that values 'though dependent solely on intrinsic properties are not themselves intrinsic properties'. [15] Intrinsic properties describe the nature of objects, but value, though intrinsic as depending on the intrinsic nature of objects, is not a quality of the objects. So, value does not give us any indication of the empirical nature or character of the objects. We ask: How does Moore come to know value as intrinsic, when value is not a quality which forms the empirical nature of objects? Are values objects of sense-intuition, or are they objects of intellectual intuition? To Moore values have objective reality. They are not mere subjective states. But with regard to the question how we know values as intrinsic, Moore admits, so it seems, some form of intuitive perception.

To Alexander value is not a sort of tertiary emergent quality emerging from the intercourse between mind and nature. Values belong to the 'totality of knower and known'. [16] Values are real, though they depend on the mind, but they are other than the primary and the secondary qualities of objects. So he gives us a negative idea of value. Values are objective qualities but how these are known, Alexander does not tell us. The conception of the objectivity of value may now be discussed under two heads, namely: (1) Values as transcendent 'oughts' without relation to a mind and also values as possessing independent objectivity as ideal being, and (2) values as belonging to reality and as related to a mind.

(1) Rickert distinguishes between the 'ought' and the 'is', and reduces the 'is' to the 'ought'. Values are in the nature of 'ought'. Values transcend reality and are prior to being. They do not exist either actually or ideally. They are not related to consciousness. Munsterberg, who belongs to the school of Rickert, conceives of a super-ego or pure will in which the logical, aesthetic, moral and religious values reside as over-individual ideals which are progressively realized by its pure will. So far as values are over-individual ends, Munsterberg's attitude seems to be satisfactory. But Rickert's conception of absolute 'ought', transcending thought and also being either actual or ideal, is not an intelligible concept. It may be said that the super-ego of Munsterberg, which is devoid of thought and feeling, is similar to the blind universal will of Schopenhauer. Ends or ideals cease to be ends, if they are pursued unconsciously. The super-ego is to be conceived of as rational and conscious. Nicolai Hartmann thinks that value possesses objectivity, but it has ideal or axiological being. Value lacks actuality or ontological objectivity, but reality includes both ontological and axiological being. Hartmann says that values 'are not capable of being directly grasped by thought: rather are they immediately discerned only by an inner vision, like Plato's Ideas'. [17] If value has ideal being and lacks actuality, how can we know value in general? We can know value when it is embodied in facts of experience.

In his conception of value, Hartmann does not take into account the subjective factor necessary for valuation. He regards value as objective, independent of valuation. So, his conception of value is realistic. He also thinks, it seems that value has only ethical structure. For, he says, 'Value is the power which stands behind the energy of the ought-to be'.^[18] But value has other structures also.

(2) To the absolute idealist value is the essence of reality and is inherent in the things. Value being objective is already real; the universe is already perfect. So absolutism, it has been pointed out, is destructive of ethical endeavor. To this our reply is that there is provision, in Hegel's system for instance, for man's freedom, even though partial, and there is scope for realization of ethical value. But, if the universe is already perfect, why should man strive for the ideal? In other words, the question is: 'Why should I be moral?' Bradley answers, 'The mind is not finite, just because it knows it is finite.'^[19] 'I am finite, I am both infinite and finite, and that's why my moral life is a perpetual progress. I must progress, because I have another which is to be, and yet never quite is myself.'^[20] The question may be answered in another way. The essence of man consists in his creative activity, for which he endeavors so rise from one state to another. The objective ideal works in him as a spiritual force. According to Iqbal; 'Divine energy is essentially spiritual, reality is, therefore, essentially spirit. But, of course, there are degrees of spirit'.^[21] The ascending spirit in man enables him to produce new values. In his third lecture (the conception of God and the meaning of prayer), Iqbal says; "...of all the creations of God he alone is capable of consciously participate in the creative life of his maker."^[22] Objective values are realized by gradual approximation. The values realized are relative and partial in the sense that they fall short of the ideal, though they are not different in meaning from the ideal. Objective values have been discovered gradually. From tribal morality we have now arrived at a conception of human morality. Such is the case with intellectual or aesthetic values.

This brings us to the conception of value as appearing in a graded series of higher and lower. In his book 'Reality and Value', Garnett distinguishes between spiritual and other values on the ground that the spiritual values are not subjective to satiety, while other values are. Anyway, we need to distinguish between subjective and objective values. Reality is the unity of all experiences. In the development of the finite self as self-conscious being, the 'lower natural tendencies have an indispensable part to play'. Realization of reality would be impossible without them. The finite self necessarily has experiences of the subjective and the objective values. It is the thought or reason in us that not only unifies and organizes our feelings and desires but also enables us to transcend the limits of individuality and to apprehend the organic unity of the universe. Our evaluation is subjective when we consider ourselves to be private or exclusive selves and fail to organize the lower natural tendencies and to escape the limits of individuality. Consciousness of objective values grows as we rise higher from the life of the natural self to a universal life. It is due to the subjective preference that one value is preferred to another which in turn is preferred by another individual. Realities being an all-inclusive whole which all values and experiences are included, the values called relative signify that they are relative because they fall short of the absolute values. There is a gradation among the relative values, but in comparison with the absolute value, these are relative. 'The higher is above the lower', says Bradley, 'not because it contains a larger number of units, but because it is the harmony of those elements which in the lower were a standing contradiction'.^[23] Progressive realization of the values means a perpetual realization.

Value and Fact:

The recognition of logic as a science of values entails a radical revision of the antithesis between fact and value, existence and value, the 'theoretic' and the 'practical'. If all 'truths' are values, there can be no absolute separation. Facts, being the objects of truths, must all imply values, and it must be vain to search for any existence which is wholly free from valuations. Now this is precisely what history shows⁽¹⁾ the search for 'true reality' in pure and unadulterated 'fact' has always been vain. Thus the absolute antithesis between fact and value collapse, because fact without value cannot be found. (2) Degrees of reality are plainly degrees of value, or about the distinction between 'reality' and 'existence'. (3) It is not psychologically possible to reach any 'fact' except by a process permeated throughout by value.

(4) lastly, it seems a conclusive logical reason for holding that every 'fact' alleged must contain a latent value, that it claims not only to be 'true' but also implicitly to be better than any other judgment it was possible to make under the circumstances. Hence, the value-relation and attitude can never be eradicated from even the merest and most stubborn 'fact'. Pure value exists as little as pure fact. Facts are always reactions- upon prior facts- and are generated by their evaluation; and, moreover, these prior facts may have been merely hypothetical constructs recommended by their prospective value.

Value and Existence:

The relation between value and fact shows that values cannot be denied existence in any world that can exist for man, and this in several senses;

- (1) They are operative in and on human minds, and find expression in human acts and embodiment in human institutions;
- (2) They can occur in, and relatively to, any universe of diction, however fanciful;
- (3) Both must be related to real existence.[24]

To conclude: Absolute values are objective in the sense that they are valid for the individual and for reality and in the sense that reason, the universal principle, acknowledge them. They determine subjective evaluation just as they determine other things of the universe, but they are independent of subjective evaluation. Value is reality and conversely, objective values are inherent characters of reality as such. Values have no meaning apart from reference to mind or consciousness. Values are eternally realized in God. 'God himself is at once the supreme Reality', says Pringle-Pattison, and, as Dante calls him, the Supreme value.

God and the Ultimate Values

The Ultimate values are the highest values and objective. These objective values are in the being of God, the supreme reality. The Qur'an says, 'To Him belong 'the highest attributes'.(57:3)'the Quran completely identifies reality with reason and reason with the good....The good is the genus and all other values are the species of it'.An inquiry into the status of these other values requires a separate discussion of the subject.

The world is for actualization of the ultimate values and it is through the agency of man that such actualization is rendered possible. Ultimate values must be maintained or sustained by God. According to the Quran, 'the first and for most attribute of God is Rabb which means provider, sustainer and cherisher'.(114:01) Hoffding thinks that values are conserved in God. Hoffding give importance to value and religion and said that, " religion is the conservation of values." [25] The objection to this view is that it conceives God as static and leaves no room for new values. But it may be pointed out that the objection does not go against conservation of values. The essence of religious belief is the conviction that ultimate values are conserved in God. 'Or prayer for spiritual improvement... is efficacious, says Caird, 'just because of the deeper conviction on which it rests- the conviction that we are already perfect, even as our Father in heaven is perfect.' The conviction does not give rise to a moral status quo, for man essentially is 'a creative activity and an ascending spirit'.

He creates circumstances for the prevalence of objective values in the life of the individual and of society. The ideal is realized through conquest of evil. 'Victor becomes victim'. [26] In spite of the fact that there have been great changes and set-backs in the course of history, the conditions of the world at present do not prove anything contrary to the preservation and production of values. Even if it is doubted that the universe will shape itself according to the cherished ideals of man, it is right still, we think, to try to promote our good. If the whole human race is to perish in future, what reason still is there for man to try to gain mastery over nature by launching a Sputnik?

It is the thought of an organic relation of man with the universe that has found expression throughout human progress and in his achievements. Objective values are spiritual forces. Nietzsche says, "...they are sources of strength". [27] which not only give meaning and significance to human values but also create a conviction in us that reality is to be understood in terms of objective values. God is not entirely knowable.

In religious consciousness, man feels that God is perfect, and that truth, good, beauty, as ultimate values, are conserved in His being. These values, even in the deepest religious experience, are not completely realized.

Conclusion:

'Everyone pictures the gods as being like himself.' [28] Said Xenophanes. We understand reality in terms of consciousness and we know it through the medium of the forms of human mind. If the idealistic view of the universe is anthropo-centric in this sense, then any system is so. By accusing a system of being anthropo-centric, one cannot make one's case stronger. For, there have been only these alternative outlooks of philosophy, namely, subjective-centric or object-centric or dialectic. If one alternative is chosen, the other alternatives are ignored or rejected. The rejected or ignored alternatives need not be dismissed as false because they also are the possible alternatives. So, each alternative outlook is valid alternatively. The thinkers will now consider for themselves whether they should like to paint God as the absolute, the embodiment of values, or as a moral governor or as a 'grand human comrade'.

The above mentioned discussion shows the following points;

The philosophic importance of the subject has been attested by the great variety and universal prevalence of values. The provisional definition of value as essentially a personal attitude, as recognition of the supremacy of the category of personality, has maintained itself and proved a clue to the labyrinth of values. It also renders somewhat the psychological debates of the schools of Meinong and Von Ehrenfels as to whether values are rooted in feeling, will, or desire. If, however, it is thought necessary to pick one among such psychological phrases, it is probably best to say that value is a personal attitude, towards an object of interest. But facts are themselves values, values established in the endeavor to analyse out the factor of givenness contained in experience, and presupposing purposive manipulation of apparent facts'. Values are also acts in so far as they presuppose valuations, purposive manipulations of data, and judgments. Accordingly, the belief that values belong to the practical side of life is well founded, and even truer than it seemed; for in ultimate analysis logic also is a science of values. Its 'theoretic' values presuppose, selections, choices, and judgments which are acts, and do not differ in kind from those which are openly 'practical'. Values therefore are not to be regarded as gratuitous additions to reality, made out of the superfluity of human perversity, but as its highest qualities and the culminating points of its significance for us.

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